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ATICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN INVESTIGATION
ROBERT

B. McKAY*

Forty-three citizens of New York State died at Attica Correctional Facility between September 9 and 13, 1971. Thirty-nine
of that number were killed and more than 80 others were wounded
by gunfire during the 15 minutes it took the State Police to retake
the prison on September 13.1
THUS BEGINS THE official report of the Attica Commission.2

The
primary lesson is apparent to anyone who thinks about those two
sentences: Everything possible must be done to avoid repetition of
that tragedy. But, before prescriptions for the future can be advanced,
there must be understanding of the past. The function of the Attica
Commission can be explained in terms almost, but not quite, that simple. A principal purpose was unquestionably to find out what happened, and why, and thus to afford insight into future action that might
be taken to prevent similar occurrences. The additional purpose, in
this particular instance, was to sift the false from the true about the
original taking of the prison; the retaking of the institution; and the rehousing of inmates after the uprising was put down. Even ordinarily
careful reporters had stated as fact, at the time of the retaking, that
some hostages had died with throats slit by inmates; that some hostages
had been emasculated; and that at least one inmate had been deliber* Chairman, New York State Special Commission on Attica; Dean and Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. Preface, Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica, p. xi
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Report].
2. Although the news media often referred to the "McKay Commission," that
seems to me a regrettable misnomer for two reasons: "Attica Commission" is more
descriptive of the task undertaken, and the report was very much the product of all
nine members of the Commission and the dozens of staff and consultants.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

ately executed after the prison had been secured.
mors all proved to be false, but insistently held.

These and other ru-

It was clearly important to find the truth and to assemble the evidence convincingly. We believe the report of the commission accomplished that objective-and more, as I shall suggest in the course of
this discussion. My purpose, however, will not be to summarize the
findings of the commission. Rather, I should like to set forth the way
in which the commission undertook to complete its assigned task of
fact-finding; the problem of relating to other governmental bodies involved with Attica; and the difficulty of communicating its message to
the public.
The narrow perimeter of the investigation was confined to the
four-day period between September 9 and September 13, 1971, from
the original capture of the prison by inmates to its retaking by the state
police. Within two days of the retaking, Governor Nelson Rockefeller
announced the first of three official inquiries that had their genesis in
the events at Attica. On September 15, 1971, Governor Rockefeller
stated that Deputy Attorney General Robert E. Fischer would supersede the district attorney of Wyoming County (where Attica is located)
to "conduct a broad investigation into the events before, during and
after the rebellion in the Attica Correctional Facility."3 The assignment was to look for violations of criminal law by inmates, correction
officers or others, as a basis for possible indictment by a special grand
jury convened for that purpose in Wyoming County.
Ordinarily, the matter would end with such an investigation leading to punishment of wrongdoers. But this case was unique. The Attica Correctional Facility had been widely regarded as the most secure
of all the maximum security institutions in New York State. Within
the Department of Corrections there was a general belief that the institution could not have been captured without advance planning and
probably even outside help, but others disagreed. Although the matter was within the scope of the grand jury investigation, it was not clear
that the ultimate questions of advance planning and external asistance
could be answered in terms of individual indictments that might be returned. Similarly, questions continued in the public mind about a
number of unresolved issues, including these: Why did prison officials not retake the institution, with or without guns, on the first day?
Why did Commissioner Oswald at first rely on "observers" to "nego3. Report, p. xxiii.
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tiate" the terms of the settlement and then reject their efforts? How
were the hostages treated and what was the level of discipline of inmates during the four days in D Yard? Was the planning for the assault adequate? Was there unnecessary brutality in rehousing captured inmates after the retaking?
There were other questions of larger import. What kind of institutions were the prisons? What purpose did they serve? Should corrective measures be undertaken?
When the governor and his advisers, including the legislative leaders of the state, met to ponder these questions, they quickly resolved
that the criminal investigation was not enough. They concluded that
two further inquiries were needed, one a citizens' committee to examine all the facts, not just those involving criminal conduct, and a
second to recommend changes in the state's correction system.
There was at least one unique problem in establishing the citizens'
fact-finding committee. Although it clearly required official status to
assure the necessary authority and funding, appointment by the governor would raise credibility problems for the body since the governor
himself and members of his immediate staff participated in the decision-making process that would in part be the subject matter of any
fact-finding investigation. Mindful of that problem, the governor and
the majority and minority leaders of the New York State Legislature
devised an unusual solution to an unusual problem. They called upon
Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals and
the four presiding justices of the state's appellate divisions (the five
highest ranking judicial officials in the state) to appoint a "citizens'
committee" to investigate "the events leading up to---during-and following the riot." 4 The accompanying statement stressed that the mission was to be fact finding with no jurisdiction over criminal aspects
of the uprising, but indicated that the panel would be asked to study
the governor's own actions during the uprising.
4. Report, p. xxiv. There are risks in this blending of executive and judicial
functions. It is not impossible that questions about the jurisdiction and authority of
the body designated by the judges could reach the appellate division or court of appeals level. See, for example, the discussion in the text at notes 13-24. This is not,
however, the first time that New York State judges have made appointments to nonjudicial bodies. In 1966, when the state legislature was unable to resolve a reapportionment impasse, the judges of the New York State Court of Appeals appointed a
five-member body to draw legislative district lines, ordinarily a legislative function.
When the reapportionment plan was challenged, it was upheld by the Court of Appeals,
the entire court participating. See Matter of Orans, 17 N.Y.2d 107, 216 N.E.2d
311 (1966).
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The five jurists announced the selection of the citizens' committee
on September 30, charging the nine members to "proceed as expeditiously as possible and render its report to the Governor, the Legislature and the public."5
The selection of the panel may have solved the governor's need
to disassociate himself from the selection process, but at the same time
it appeared to create a new credibility problem for the panel itself.
The Attica Defense Committee and other prison-watchers were quick
to argue that a panel whose average age was about 50 and consisted of
five white males, two white females (one of Puerto Rican background
and upperclass connections), and two black males, 6 could not possibly
understand the trauma of prison life. Correction officers, state troopers, national guardsmen, and officials in the correction system were
equally unimpressed with a panel that could not by any stretch of the
imagination be said to include representatives of their viewpoint. Upstate New Yorkers could again voice their traditional complaint of under-representation, since only one of nine came from Western New
York (where, after all, Attica is located), and only two others from upstate at all, both from Albany. Finally, as we were soon to learn,
some members of the executive branch thought the whole idea of a citinzens' inquiry a mistake that could only harm the chief executive and
his staff.
5. Report, p. xxiv. The commission members were the following:
Robert B. McKay, Chairman of the Commission, Dean of the New York University School of Law;
Edwin B. Broderick, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany;
Robert L. Carter, a member of the law firm of Poletti Friedin Prashker Feldmann & Gartner in New York City;
Mrs. Amalia R. Guerrero, founder and president of the Society of Friends of
Puerto Rico and former member of the New York State Park Commission
for the City of New York;
Amos Henix, a former inmate, and currently Executive Director of Reality House,
a drug rehabilitation program in Manhattan;
Burke Marshall, Deputy Dean of the Yale University Law School and former head
of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department;
Walter Rothschild, Chairman of the Board of the New York Urban Coalition and

formerly president of Abraham & Straus;
Mrs. Dorothy Wadsworth, an active participant in community projects in Rochester
and Monroe County, and now Director of Development at the Rochester
Institute of Technology;

William Wilbanks, a doctoral candidate at the School of Criminal Justice, State
University of New York at Albany.
6. One black male, a former inmate of state and federal institutions, we later
discovered was not technically eligible to serve on the panel because he had not been
pardoned. No challenge was made to his extremely valuable service. The other black
male was confirmed as a United States district court judge after completion of the
report.
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There was in fact another objection that could have been raised
to the idea of the panel and its composition. Less commonly voiced,
but an ironic commentary on the capacity of the panel to answer the
question posed to it, was the fact that most members of the panel had
never been inside a prison (although, as previously noted, one had
served time in other prisons and was to find friends among the inmates
at Attica); and none had any real acquaintance with the correction
system. In an odd sense, our principal collective qualification was the
openmindedness of ignorance, combined with the willingness to be informed of facts without preconceptions to make difficult the forming of
reasoned judgment.
When each of us accepted initial appointment (without knowing
the composition of the full panel), not one of us could have known all
the crises of credibility we would face. Thus, still largely innocent of
the problems that lay ahead, we met for the first time on the night of
October 5, some of us in New York City as we assembled to fly together to Albany, and the others later that evening as we met at the
governor's mansion to discuss problems and procedures with the governor and members of his staff. The following morning we met with
the governor, the legislative leaders, and key members of the executive
branch. We were assured that we would receive in a forthcoming executive order the necessary authority (primarily subpoena power and
assurance of cooperation from state officials), all necessary funds,
and coequal status with the already-commenced criminal investigation.
It was then agreed by all present that the panel should operate independently in order to assure the appearance as well as the fact of independent judgment on the crucial questions of fact.
Arrangements were promptly made for a private meeting room
in the new quarters of the New York State Bar Association in Albany.
There, meeting for the first time in executive session, we made several
decisions crucial to the success of the undertaking.
First, while recognizing the need for private sessions to decide
policy questions, we concluded that all decisions relating to the investigation should be publicly announced and that as much of the investigation as possible should be open to public scrutiny. This decision to
"go public" meant the issuance of press releases, the holding of press
conferences (including one after that first meeting), and preparation
for disclosure of testimony and findings during the course of the investigation rather than solely in a final report.
Second, we agreed that an attempt should be made to interview
every individual who was in any way involved with Attica in Septem-
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ber 1971. This involved more than 2200 inmates; all the correction officers and other officials at the institution; state troopers, national guardsmen and sheriff's deputies called to the scene; the 33 observers and all
relevant state officials, including Governor Rockefeller, Commissioner
Oswald and his deputies, and representatives of the governor whom he
7
sent to Attica.
The decision to seek several thousand interviews meant that we
would need a substantial staff, operating over several months, at various locations in New York State. The cost we estimated that first day
would be more than $250,000, a figure ultimately revised upward to
about $660,000. Since we knew that the success or failure of the venture would depend in large part on the quality of the chief of staff, we
agreed to seek advice from as many sources as possible about that individual who, we thought, should be a lawyer with the title of general
counsel. Without recounting the process of screening the large numbers of candidates, some of whom were interviewed, it is quite enough
to say that a number of respected sources pointed to a single individual
as the one best qualified for the assignment. We ultimately succeeded
in persuading that man, Arthur L. Liman, a partner in the prestigious
New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, to
undertake the task. His performance exceeded in every respect the
high standards we had set.
By mid-November of 1971 the staff of lawyers, investigators, administrators, and clerks (ultimately 36 full time and many more part
time as consultants) was beginning to take shape. On November 23
the full commission met for the first time at Attica to visit the prison,
talk with the officials, review the interviewing procedures, and eat with
inmates and corrections officers.
By the end of November we had four offices, in New York City,
Rochester, Batavia (the nearest town to Attica with office space), and
in the prison itself. The interview forms had been completed and
tested; the interviews were well under way; and consultants had been
secured.
November was also the month when we first realized how serious
the potential conflict was with the criminal investigation which was
in its near-final stage before the return of indictments, then
7. Other decisions, less crucial, but mechanically necessary, were these: The
"citizens' committee" would be called officially the New York State Special Commission on Attica; and my role was changed from that of convening chairman to chairman.
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estimated for January 1972. The difficulty was that the staff of Deputy Attorney General Fischer was looking for evidence of individual
criminal conduct while we sought more general findings on an essentially no-name basis.' This created two basic problems, with a number of refinements. The two main issues were in a sense reciprocal in
that each investigating body potentially wanted or needed information
in the possession of the other. Deputy Attorney General Fischer
and his investigators had been on the scene soon enough after the retaking to collect physical evidence, such as weapons in the possession
of inmates in D Yard, and to take photographs that were nearly contemporaneous with the events in question. Of course, the criminal
investigators had the films, recordings, and still pictures taken by various official groups during the uprising and the retaking. As official
data, that was not part of the "work product" of the investigations,
those items were essential to the fact-finding investigation. Fortunately, we learned before issuance of the executive order that the
release of this evidence to the commission would be resisted, giving us
an opportunity to make sure that the executive order gave the commission equal access to that data. Thereafter, there were a number of
disagreements about what we were entitled to receive. 9 Although
each request had to be separately negotiated (unnecessarily, we
thought), ultimately we secured nearly all the records we thought essential.
The reciprocal problem was more serious. The executive order
originally proposed to confer the necessary power upon the commission
would have subordinated the commission to the criminal investigation
being conducted by Deputy Attorney General Fischer. The objectionable language was the following:
The [commission] shall not take any action or engage in any activity that would jeopardize or prejudice the criminal investigations or prosecutions arising from the events at Attica Correctional
Facility or the fair consideration of any pending criminal matter,
or the rights and privileges of those individuals who may be the
subject of such criminal investigations or prosecutions.
8. It was the commission's policy, observed throughout the report, to use names
of participants in the uprising and the retaking only where the indivdual was no
longer living or had himself publicly revealed the information in question. Names were
of course not withheld as to state officials or prison officials who had responsibility
for the decision-making process and the actions of the observers were reported by name.
9. The commission always acknowledged that we were not entitled to, and would
not seek, access to interviews or other evidence of a nonofficial character that was
secured by the investigating staff in preparation of the cases for presentation to the
grand jury.
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If that restriction had been imposed, we would have been prevented from even talking to witnesses who might be involved in the
criminal investigation; and our investigation would in effect have been
emasculated. While recognizing that the investigation we planned
might in some respects adversely affect potential criminal prosecutions,
we had understood from the beginning that this was an acceptable and
necessary price to pay for the "full and impartial investigation and
complete report" that we had been asked to provide.
The proposed executive order presented additional difficulties, as
follows:
1. It would have required that all hearings be private, which
of course would have been inconsistent with the decision made at the
first meeting of the commission that at least some hearings be held in
public. The problem remained of achieving credibility for the commission which we thought required regular reports to the public of our
findings on the events and conditions at Attica.
2. The proposed executive order would have forbidden publication of the report until all criminal proceedings had been completed,
which would almost certainly be a matter of some years. Clearly this
was inconsistent with the concept of a prompt report to the public.
3. The proposed executive order appeared to require that all essential acts of the commission take place in Wyoming County, specifically including enforcement of any subpoenas that might be issued.
We saw no reason to depart from ordinary practice, which would allow
enforcement of a subpoena anywhere within the state where the production of witnesses or documents might be required.
4. The proposed order did not instruct state departments and
agencies to cooperate with the commission. In particular, as already
mentioned, we felt that we must have access to the raw materials (such
as films and physical evidence) gathered during the criminal investigation as well as the right to an independent interview with all relevant
state witnesses. Since the criminal investigation was under way before
the commission, it did not seem appropriate that the commission's investigation should be blocked in part by the adventitious discovery of
pertinent materials by the staff of the deputy attorney general.
5. Finally, and ultimately most important, was the concern that
the proposed executive order would leave commission files open to subpoena by those responsible for the criminal investigation. We knew
that, in order to secure the cooperation of witnesses essential to the
fact-finding mission, the commission must, at a minimum, be able to
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guarantee that the testimony and statements of witnesses would remain
confidential in the commission files and not subject to subpoena by
the prosecution.
In view of the above real and potential problems, the commission
concluded that it would not be possible to conduct the "full and impartial investigation" with which we were charged under the terms of the
proposed executive order. We were able to resolve some, but not all,
of the issues at the staff level; but at last it became necessary to appeal
in strong terms for Governor Rockefeller's personal intervention to secure an acceptable executive order. By letter of November 3, 1971, I
reported to the Governor that, in the absence of explicit reassurance on
these points, "some-perhaps all-members of the Commission will
withdraw" from the investigation.
After further discussion all questions were apparently resolved as
the commission had requested. Most of the issues in dispute were settled in the executive order of November 15, 1971.0 One significant
point was left to oral agreement, which we believed was reached; but
the absence of explicit written agreement on that point ultimately led
to judicial proceedings not resolved until more than four months after
issuance of the report. The issue involved the central question of how
to prevent two official bodies, each armed with subpoena power, from
securing access to each other's files. As noted above, we felt it imperative to retain the privacy of our own investigative files, particularly
the records of individual interviews; and we had no interest in securing
comparable work product of the deputy attorney general's staff, excepting only such physical data as was secured from the prison after the
retaking and films and like material with the status of official documents. Accordingly, we sought (and thought we secured) agreement
that neither body would subpoena records of the other, and that we
would negotiate for access to materials of the kind described above as
needed.
In accordance with that understanding, the commission completed
its investigation without ever using the subpoena power to secure any
materials from the deputy attorney general. Only after the commission report was in print did Deputy Attorney General Fischer disclose
that he did not feel bound by any oral agreement, simultaneously seeking access to all commission files with a sweeping subpoena duces
tecum. The issues in that litigation are discussed below at pages 149153.
10. The text of the executive order appears as Appendix A.
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Meanwhile, on the assumption that the commission would be able
to assure inmates, correction officers, and others that interview reports
would be treated as confidential and not made available to the state,
the commission staff prepared interview forms and instructions to interviewers. 1 More important, for present purposes, is the statement
then prepared which was subsequently read to all the interviewees
whose cooperation was sought for fact-finding purposes. The following
statement, read to all inmates, is typical of the statement read to other
interviewees as well:
I am a member of the staff of the New York State Special
Commission on Attica. Are you familiar with the McKay Commission? (If the inmate is not familiar with the Commission, the
information packet contains a description of the Commission which
was previously read to the inmates over the prison radio).
Our Commission is completely independent of all other State
agencies. We are not connected with [Deputy Attorney General]
Fischer, and we are not assisting in any way the prosecution of any
persons. That is not our business. We are perfectly free to
criticize any persons, no matter how high their public position, as
the facts may warrant. We have the power to hold public hearings
and to issue subpoenae for witnesses and for the production of
documents, and to issue a public report on our findings.
The sources of the information given to us in these preliminary
interviews will be kept completely anonymous. Not only do we
have no connection whatsoever with [Deputy Attorney General]
Fischer's investigation, or with any other prosecutor or State
agency, but we are not connected with the prison authorities, the
Parole Board, or any other governmental body. None of them
will find out who is the source of our information, or who is not
cooperating with us.
Despite this, you do not have to talk to us at all at this time.
You will not suffer any consequences if you refuse to cooperate
with us. If there are subjects which you do not wish to discuss
with us, we will respect your wishes and not go into them in this interview. If at any time you feel that you want to have your lawyer present, we will arrange for it, or see to it that a lawyer is appointed for you.
The only way that the full and true story of Attica can be told
is for all to cooperate, and we believe that cooperation of all is essential if there is to be any chance of prison reform and of avoiding
another such tragedy in the future.
The statement prompts two observations:
1. The so-called Miranda2 warning was not given to any person
11. The key provisions of the interviewer instructions and of the interview forms
appear as Appendices B and C. Although only marginally relevant to the legal questions here considered, they are offered for what I believe them to be, valuable models
for future investigations.
12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1967).
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interviewed. Thus, no interviewee was advised that any statement
he made might be used against him, as would be required in a case
that might lead to criminal prosecution. Obviously, if the commission
had in any way contemplated a voluntary or involuntary relinquishment
of interview records to a body with prosecutorial authority, use of the
statement would have been the height of impropriety. Deputy Attorney Fischer was aware that these assurances were being given, but
made no effort to stop their use.
2. Not only was the Miranda warning not given, actually the reverse was the case; each interviewee was specifically advised that "The
sources of the information given to us in these preliminary interviews
will be kept completely anonymous."
Despite the fact that the above-described assurances were given to
thousands of interviewees, and despite Deputy Attorney General Fischer's knowledge of that fact, in early September 1972 he issued a subpoena duces tecum, seeking to compel production before the grand jury
in Wyoming County of
any and all testimony, statements, interview reports, writings of
any kind, any and all other reports, tables, charts, diagrams, photographs, film or any other audio or visual material relating to the
investigation .... 13
The argument advanced in favor of the subpoena was essentially
threefold. First, it was claimed that in the absence of a written agreement pledging nonuse of the subpoena power the deputy attorney general was free to seek the commission files. Second, it was contended
that the commission files were not protected by any privilege and were
accordingly subject to seizure by any body with subpoena power.
Thir-d, it was asserted that the files were not sought primarily to gather
further incriminatory evidence, but to search out exculpatory material so
that the prosecuting authorities and the grand jury could "satisfy themselves pre-indictment that no exculpatory material is in the hands of the
McKay Commission (a State agency)." This argument was said to be
supported by the doctrine of Brady v. Maryland 4 and People v. Rosario,15 to the effect that "a District Attorney or one operating pursuant
13. There was an accompanying order to show cause "why an order should not be
entered herein enjoining and prohibiting temporarily and permanently [the commission] from destroying, obliterating, altering or disposing in part or in full in any way"
the materials subject to the subpoena. Since the commission had no intention of
destroying its files, this demand was easily satisfied, leaving only the subpoena at issue.
14. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
15. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 866 (1961).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

to law with the powers of a District Attorney with respect to an investigation has the power and the duty to seek all evidence."
The commission disagreed on all points and moved to quash the
subpoena. The issues were briefed and argued on November 10,
1972, to New York State Supreme Court Justice Carman F. Ball, the
justice who was responsible for the grand jury proceedings. The commission's response to the three points raised in support of the subpoena
can be summarized as follows.
The commission asserted the executive privilege and the public
interest privilege to establish the immunity of its files from subpoena.
The executive privilege argument was based on general principles and
on a specific New York statute. Section 6 of the New York Executive
Law, under which the commission was appointed, authorizes the governor "either in person or by one or more persons appointed by him
for the purpose, to examine and investigate the management and affairs
of any department, board, bureau or commission of the State." In
conducting its investigation pursuant to the governor's mandate, the
commission was thus the direct arm of the governor. Accordingly,
its actions, files, and records are entitled to protection under the blanket of the executive privilege. Significantly, Governor Rockefeller
agreed that the files were entitled to immunity and directed Attorney
General Louis J. Lefkowitz to support the commission in that argument before the court. That function was admirably performed by
Assistant Attorney General George Zuckerman, resulting in the unusual phenomenon of two subordinates of the New York State Attorney General arguing on opposite sides of the same issue.16
Apart from the statutory argument applicable in New York State,
the doctrine of executive privilege, based upon the constitutional principle of separation of powers, holds that the chief executive of a state,
like the President of the United States, may not directly or indirectly be
subpoenaed or ordered to testify or produce documents before a court
of grand jury. As one scholar has observed, "no court has ever compelled the chief executive to furnish information in a judicial proceed7
ing.",'
16. The commission's position was also supported by two intervenors representing inmates as individuals and as members of a class.
17. Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 875, 892 n.72 (1966).
The landmark American case approving the doctrine of executive privilege is Hartranft's
Appeal, 85 Pa. 433 (1878).
To the same effect in New York State, see Gaynor v.
Rockefeller, 21 A.D.2d 92 (1st Dep't 1964), alf'd, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627
(1965); Glen v. Rockefeller, 61 Mis. 2d 942, 304 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.),
aff'd, 34 A.D.2d 930, 313 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1st Dep't 1970).
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Courts have also recognized the existence of a common law public
interest privilege, applicable to confidential communications made to
public officers in the performance of their duties, where it is in the
public interest that the content and sources of such communications
should not be divulged.'" To open the files of a confidential executive
department investigation for use in a criminal prosecution would make
impossible any future noncriminal investigations into matters even of
great importance to the public. Never again could witnesses rely upon
a state agency's assurances of confidentiality. "To violate the privileged status of disclosures" made to the commission would "vitiate the
purpose" for which such investigatory bodies are created.' 9
The commission also rejected the contention that Deputy Attorney
General Fischer was duty-bound to seek the commission's files,
whether for the purpose of aiding in the prosecution of alleged wrongdoers, or for the exculpation of those not involved in criminal activities. The commission argued that Mr. Fischer's reliance on Brady v.
Maryland and People v. Rosario was misplaced. Those cases held
only that the prosecutor is required, at the time of trial, to release evidence in his possession that is requested by defendants in criminal
proceedings. This sensible rule is designed to prevent the manifest
unfairness which would result from a trial at which the prosecution
knowingly adduced evidence which was contradicted by other evidence
in its possession. Consistent with that ruling the courts have refused
to order the production of evidence in the hands of governmental agencies which had not cooperated with the prosecution in the preparation
of its case."
Finally, the commission contended that there was an agreement
for mutual abstention from use of a subpoena to secure any files of the
other investigating body, which was no less binding because it was not in
writing. Both bodies in question were official state agencies acting in the
name of the state; both were accordingly bound by agreements authori18. See, e.g., Matter of Langert v. Tenney, 5 A.D.2d 586 (Ist Dep't 1958), appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d 875, 155 N.E.2d 870 (1959); People v. Keating, 286 App.
Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1955); Nields v. Lea, 274 App. Div. 890, 82
N.Y.S.2d 512 (2d Dep't 1948).
19. Board of Ethics v. Temporary State Commission, 70 Misc. 2d 737, 334 N.Y.S.
2d 691 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1972).
20. United States v. Lawrenson, 298 F.2d 880 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
947 (1962); Kaufman v. United States, 268 F.2d 484 (E.D. Mo. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 395 U.S. 217 (1968); Conyers v. Wainwright, 307 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Fla.
1970); State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965), vacated on other grounds,
386 U.S. 66 (1967); State v. Reynolds, 422 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1967). See also
Johnson v. Bennett, 286 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1967).
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tatively made in their respective names. This question could be answered only through the holding of an evidentiary hearing and the
testimony of a number of state officials. This unpleasant exercise in
public display of official disagreement would, however, not be necessary, if the commission's position, that its files are protected by the executive privilege, should be sustained. 2 ' Accordingly, the ultimate legal
question in the case involved the applicability of the executive privilege
or the public interest privilege as a protection for the commission files;
an argument discussed above.
On January 15, 1973,22 the trial court granted the commission's
motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that "the
public interest requires that the files and records of the Commission
should not be turned over to the Grand Jury."2 3 Adopting the argument in favor of the public interest privilege that had been urged by the
commission, the court reasoned as follows:
It seems to be almost beyond question that if the Commission
in this case had not been able to assure its informants that their
identities and information would be held confidential, the Commission could not have performed its important task which was so
much in the public interest.
The Court recognizes that there are two competing public interests. On the one hand there is the public interest in the Grand
Jury's exercise of its constitutional power to obtain all relevant evidence for the purpose of holding those responsible for their criminal acts and, on the other hand, there is the public interest in the
performance of the duties of the McKay Commission to find out
the circumstances which brought about the tragedy at the Attica
Correctional Facility regardless of the criminal responsibility.
The object of the Commission was to establish the facts, not to
indict or punish. (Matter of DiBrizzi, 303 N.Y. 206) In order
to function it was necessary for the Commission to promise confidentiality. The McKay Commission's need for secrecy is a real
one and is entitled to consideration. The ultimate decision as to
disclosure lies with the courts, but great, if not conclusive weight,
should be given to the claim of privilege when the circumstances
are such that the harm which would result from an unwarranted
disclosure is apparent. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1
21. For this reason the commission also argued that the issue presented was a
"political question" which the court was not required to decide.
22. Meanwhile, there was a brief flurry of litigation in federal court, when a
class action on behalf of inmates was brought to restrain disclosure of the commission files to Deputy Attorney General Fischer and his staff. Blyden v. Rockefeller,
Civ. No. - (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But this case, argued in October 1972, did not produce a decision. Judge Gagliardi deferred action to await the outcome of the proceedings in the state court.
23. Fischer v. Citizens' Committee, - N.Y.S.2d - (Sup. Ct., Wyoming Co.,
January 15, 1973).
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(1953); Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa. 433 (1878); Harding v. Pinchot, 306 Pa. 139, 159 Ad. 16 at 18, (Sup. Ct. of Pa. 1932).
In this case, to require disclosure would violate the integrity of
the Commission's promise of confidentiality to thousands of witnesses and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Executive Department to ever again conduct a confidential investigation into any matter in which there might be2 4criminal aspects
where a Grand Jury is conducting an investigation.
The court did not decide the executive privilege argument and
did not make a finding on the question whether there had been an
agreement between Deputy Attorney General Fischer and the commission that the commission files would be immune from official subpoena. However, the court did observe that the grand jury was not
precluded from its own examination of witnesses who had appeared
before the commission; and it left unanswered the question whether
disclosure could be ordered of statements made to the commission-or
its staff during any later trial of individuals indicted by the grand jury
for crimes arising out of the Attica events. The court dealt with the
question of subsequent trial only in these ambiguous terms:
In the event that a witness on the trial of an indictment had made a
prior statement to the McKay Commission, it will be for the Trial
Court to determine whether
or not such statement should be made
25
available at the trial.
Finally, to ensure that the issue was not mooted, the court ordered
that the files not be destroyed or otherwise disposed of, a result entirely
consistent with an earlier decision of the commission to preserve the files.
With this judicial ruling the commission is apparently discharged
of the last of its obligations in connection with the investigation begun
almost 16 months earlier. There remains only the custodial function in
connection with the files and disposition of any issues that would be
raised if any defendants in a criminal proceeding should demand access
to statements made to the commission.
24. Id. at-.
25. Id. at -.
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Appendix A
TO ALL WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING:
WHEREAS, the public interest requires a full and impartial investigation and complete report of the facts and circumstances leading up to,
during, and following the events that occurred at the Attica Correctional
Facility between on or about September 9, 1971 and September 13, 1971: and
WHEREAS, such investigation and report will be in addition to, apart
from and not in lieu of the investigation of criminal acts related to such events
now being conducted by Deputy Attorney General Robert E. Fischer for the
purpose of grand jury presentation and possible criminal prosecutions: and
WHEREAS, on September 16, 1971, Senate Majority Leader Earl W.
Brydges, Assembly Speaker Perry B. Duryea, Jr., Senate Minority Leader
Joseph Zaretzki, Assembly Minority Leader Stanley Steingut and I requested
Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld of the Court of Appeals, Presiding Justice Harold
A. Stevens of the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, Presiding
Justice Samuel Rabin of the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department,
Presiding Justice J. Clarence Herlihy of the Appellate Division, Third Judicial
Department, and Presiding Justice Harry D. Goldman of the Appellate
Division, Fourth Judicial Department, to appoint a Citizens Committee to
conduct the investigation and
WHEREAS, on October 1, 1971, a Citizens Committee composed of
Robert B. McKay, Chairman, Most Reverend Edwin Broderick, Robert L.
Carter, Mrs. Mariano (Amalia) Guerrero, Amos Henrix, Burke Marshall,
Walter N. Rothschild, Jr., Mrs. Robert H. (Dorothy) Wadsworth, and
William Willbanks was named;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Nelson A. Rockefeller, pursuant to section six
of the Executive Law, have appointed and by these presents do appoint said
named members of the Citizens Committee, to conduct a full and impartial
investigation of the facts and circumstances leading up to, during and following the events which occurred at the Attica Correctional Facility between on
or about September 9, 1971 and September 13, 1971.
The Committee is hereby empowered, pursuant to section six of the
Executive Law and in accord with the Civil Practice Law and Rules, to
subpoena and enforce the attendance of witnesses, to administer oaths and
examine witnesses under oath and to require the production of any books or
papers deemed relevant or material.
Every State department, division, board, bureau and agency shall
provide to the Committee every assistance, facility and cooperation which
may be necessary or desirable for the accomplishment of the duties or purposes of the Committee under this order.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed
my name to these Presents and caused the
Privy Seal of the State to be affixed hereto
at the Capitol in the City of Albany this
fifteenth day of November in the year of
(L.S.)
our Lord one thousand nine hundred
seventy-one.
(signed) Nelson A. Rockefeller
BY THE GOVERNOR
(signed) Robert R. Douglass
Secretary to the Governor
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Appendix B
NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA
December, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
Memorandum to Interviewers
You have been selected to assist us in the important task of interviewing
the inmates who were at Attica on September 9, 1971. We feel that lawyers
and law students such as you are well-trained to conduct questioning objectively and probe sufficiently into all of the matters of concern to the
Commission. You will be working from an outline prepared as a guide in
order to ensure that each interview covers all pertinent topics. You will be
able to study the outline in detail before you conduct any interviews on your
own. But you should not feel confined to the outline; we are relying on you
to conduct the interview in the manner most conducive to develop the facts
on the pertinent topics.
Because of the extraordinary sensitivity of this investigation, certain
standards of conduct must be maintained for all members of the Commission's
staff. Most of these should be obvious, but they are set forth below:
1. Members of the Commission staff must not only be objective during
their interviews; they must conduct themselves with impartiality at all times
while they are present at Attica or any other correctional facility. The Commission needs, and so far has obtained, the cooperation of many diverse
groups-inmates, correction officers, state police, administrators-and that
delicate balance could be destroyed by overt demonstrations of sympathy or
hostility to any one of them on the part of staff members. In addition, the
ultimate credibility and public acceptance of the Commission's findings will
depend in large measure upon the image created by its staff during the
course of the investigation.
2. The introduction to the inmate interview, which you must be sure
to read to the inmate at the outset of each interview, informs the inmate that
he is under no compulsion to talk to us and that his anonymity as the source
of any information he gives us will be scrupulously guarded. Naturally, that
kind of assurance will be meaningless unless every interviewer is pledged to
keep everything he or she learns during each interview, and the sources of information, in the strictest confidence. Rumors travel around penal institutions
like wildfire and any breach of this rule of confidentiality could have serious,
perhaps tragic consequences. In this respect, therefore, we are asking for
more than the normal observance of legal ethics. You should not embark
on this assignment if you are unwilling to keep what you learn in confidence.
3. The Commission's report will be the Commission's, not the staff's.
We do not know what the conclusions of that report will be-only that it
will be based on the facts uncovered by our investigation. We intend to
involve all members of the staff in the discussions leading up to the report,
since the time for dissent is before, not after, the report is written. Since the
Commission and the staff will be under restraints of confidentiality in
publicly revealing some of the information underlying the report, we must
accept the fact that no matter how the public may debate or criticize the
report, once it is issued, the staff cannot do so without jeopardizing the confidences of the inmates and others whom we are interviewing. We must be
professionally silent.
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4. Before you actually conduct any interviews on your own, you will
be orally briefed by a member of the legal staff concerning the outlines of
the events last September, life at Attica, and the basic inmate grievances
which have been developed through preliminary interviews. You will also
sit through one or more interviews conducted by a permanent staff member,
in brder to get the feel of the interviewing procedures. By the time you are
interviewing on your own, you should have a command of the underlying
facts and the vernacular of Attica. During the interviews, it is important to
use neutral terminology in sensitive areas. For example, refer to the "events"
or "occurrences" of last September, not the "riot", "rebellion" or "massacre"
Guards are called "correctional officers"; inmates are not called "prisoners"
or "convicts" though as you will learn, in the vernacular, prisons are referred
to as "joints", and officers are sometimes referred to by some inmates as the
"man".
5. During an interview, you should make notes of the inmate's responses
in the space provided in the questionnaire and in the margins. You will be
given time after each interview to complete your notes and also fill in the
Interviewer's Evaluation on the last page. Be sure each interview begins
with a reading of the Introduction and ends with an expression of appreciation
to the inmate for his assistance. Spanish surnamed inmates should be asked
if they would prefer to be interviewed in Spanish. If such a preference is
expressed, the inmate should be told that it will be arranged and he will be
called back at a later date.
6. Inmates cannot receive cigarettes in their packages from home, and
therefore can obtain them only at the prison commissary. Since many
inmates will chain-smoke during an interview, it is unfair to have them use
their own cigarettes. Be sure that you have cigarettes on the table, and invite
the inmate to use them.
7. Inmates may not accord law students the same respect as professionals. Our law student have been hired as investigators, and should
introduce themselves as such, though, of course, if anybody asked his background or qualifications, he should respond candidly. To provide some
background for you, the following materials are enclosed with this memorandunm:
a) a copy of the Executive Order of November 15, 1971 creating the
Commission;
b) Copies of sections of the Executive Law and the Civil Rights Law
of New York State (§ 73(8) of the Civil Rights Law is the source
of the Commission's power to keep information secret);
c) Copies of press releases relating to the recent activities of the
Commission and its staff;
d) A tentative chronology of the events of September 8-13, 1971, as
reported in some of the press;
e) A drawing of Attica with key locations noted. (This drawing is
from a Rochester newspaper and is used only for convenience. We
do not necessarily accept the factual conclusions contained therein).
Thank you for your willingness to help us. We hope it is a rewarding
experience for you.
Good luck!
The Commission Staff
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Appendix C
Was inmate in D Yard

Company on 9/9/71
INMATE QUESTIONNAIRE

I.

BACKGROUND

DATA

(To be taken from Prison Records
before interview begins)
NAME
Age
Address before Attica
Offense and Term
When Admitted to Attica

Inmate #

ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

(As observed by interviewer)
___White
.
_Black
II.

P uerto Rican

__

Other

PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. Have you served time in other institutions?
____Yes
--- No
2. If yes, which ones, when and how long?
NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF ANSWER TO ABOVE QUESTION WAS "YES", BE SURE TO
GET COMPARATIVE OPINIONS ON ATTICA vs. OTHER
INSTITUTIONS.
3. Have you ever been out on parole on your present sentence?
__Yes
-No
4. Why remanded.
JOB ASSIGNMENT

5. Job at Attica; How assigned, any other jobs requested; (We are
interested in any complaints about job favoritism or discrimination on race or other basis).
III.

GRIEVANCES

6. We've heard a lot about inmate grievances. What, if any, complaints do you have about Attica?
INTERVIEWER: Try not to suggest grievances or to spend
inordinate time on this subject. Let inmate discuss as many
grievances as occur to him. On anything out of the ordinary, get
details. Also ask how Attica compares with other penal institutions and whether conditions were improving or getting worse
before September

Among the common grievances we have heard:
- Medical
- Food
- Parole Board

- Strictness of Rules
- Religious & Political
Freedom
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- Idleness
- Inadequate Hygiene
- Lack of job training

and opportunities
- Lack of adequate recre-

ational facilities
- Strictness of Guards

and attitude
-

IV.

Wages
Disciplinary Procedure
Racial Discrimination
Library
Censorship

- Homosexual Assaults
- Lack of Grievance Procedure
- Restrictions on Visits

- Inadequacy of Parole Board
- Physical or Verbal abuse from

staff or other inmates
- Lack of integration of staff,

including no Puerto Rican
officers
- Discriminatory sentences
- Generation Gap
- Militancy

CHANGES AND UNDERCURRENTS BEFORE SEPTEMBER
(We are looking for events or attitudes that may have contributed
to the September upheaval)
7. Has Attica changed since you have been here?
When and in what respect?
8. How does Attica compare with other prisons?
9. What does inmate know of August, 1970, sit-down strike in
metal shop and subsequent wage increase?
(This is pertinent because it was an act of organized disobedience
which appeared to produce results)
10. What does inmate know of July, 1971, demands for reform?
It is alleged that non-action on these demands produced frustration).
11. What effect, if any, did disturbances at Auburn, Tombs and other
penal institutions have at Attica?
12. Did Judge Curtin's decision on the Auburn transferees have
any effect?
13. Death of George Jackson-How day of mourning (August 22)
was organized, extent of participation, effect . . .
14. Sick call strike in August (200 or so inmates showed up) How
organized, effect?
15. Commissioner Oswald's visit in September, 1971 to AtticaKnowledge? Effect?

V. EVENTS OF WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8.
16. Did you expect trouble on Thursday, September 9?
If so, Why? (We are looking to see if inmate will volunteer
information on incidents affecting A-5 Company
on Wednesday or any indication of prearrangements.
17. Knowledge of the incident in A Yard on September 8, involving
Dewar and Lammonte of A-5 and the Lieutenant, their subsequent removal to the box and the throwing of the glass at the
officer who was removing them. (We are looking both for
personal and heresay knowledge to the extent that such hearsay
was contemporaneous and may have led inmates to expect or
plan trouble-in other words, what effect these incidents had on
inmates.)
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VI.

INMATES ACCOUNT OF HOW ATTICA WAS TAKEN BY INMATES AND WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE PERIOD

18. Narrative of what he did and observed from Sept. 8 until assault
on Sept. 13. If he did not end up in D Yard, this can be short;
if he was, try to find out his personal knowledge and, where
pertinent, attitudes about the following, among others:
-How he ended up in yard
-How hostages were taken and treated
-Who ran things in Yard and how leaders emerged
-Election of Gallery representatives-was he one?
-How were security guards selected? Was he one?
-Oswald visits
-How order was maintained, and were there acts of violence and
appraisal
-What observers (by name if he recalls) recommended, and what
effect their speeches had
-Why wasn't Oswald's offer accepted? Who opposed?
-Was there a vote on Oswald's offer?
-Were there any other votes?
-How important was amnesty and flight demand?
-Was Oswald's Monday A.M. ultimatum communicated?
Voted upon?
-Did he expect an assault with guns?
-Did anybody advocate acceptance?
-Fear of dissent?
-Punishment of dissenters?
-Amount and type of weapons held by inmates.
-Discussion of Rockefeller visit, and effect, if any, of his refusal.
-Was the "riot" petering out and would it have ended soon
without assault.
19. Did he want to be in the Yard?
20. If he could have, would he have left YardWhy or why not?
VII.

ASSAULT--SEPTEMBER

13, 1971 A.M.

21. Where were hostages at the time of the assault; what was being
done to them; threats to them, knives at throat, etc.?
22. Where was inmate when assault began, and what happened to
him until the moment he was moved from D. Yard? If wounded,
get details, including location.
23. Did he hear orders from helicopter; what were they, and relationship in time to shooting.
24. Did he see any inmate or hostage get hurt?
(Get details, including names and locations)
25. Did he see any troopers or others shooting?
(Get details, locations, etc.)
26. Did he see Barclay, Hicks, Melville at the time of the assault?
Details . .

VIII. HARASSMENT OR REPRISAL ACTS
27. Narrative of what happened to him after he left D Yard, with
details of any acts of harassment, brutality, reprisals, including
where and by whom.
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IX.

SCHWARTZ,

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
X.

HESS & PRIVATERA

Did you know them?
Did you see them in the Yard?
Why were they taken, and when?
Why were they killed-when?
Did he hear them scream?

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

33. Have current conditions changed much from before?
34. What is the mood of the inmates?
35. Do you have any additional problems that have occurred after
the event?
36. What do you feel is the lesson of Attica?
INTERVIEWER'S EVALUATION
Date

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Interviewee
Interviewer
Should this inmate be seen by a member of the permanent staff for a
more intensive interview? If so, why?
Does he have particular knowledge of any portion of the September
events?
Which ones?
Do you think this inmate was reluctant to talk to you but would talk to
another staff member (of his own race or age), or would talk if we got
him a lawyer?
Do you think this inmate is a potential witness for public hearings? Why,
and on what subject(s)?
Did he say anything which should be noted with respect to the interview
of another particular inmate?

